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Abstract 
This paper analyzes factors that lead to opposition towards policies in Switzerland that promote a 
clean energy transition. During legislative processes, both the elite and general citizens can develop 
resistance towards such policies. The article considers those two perspectives and determines, on 
both levels, factors that explain opposition. We also specifically take into account whether climate 
change skepticism, i.e., questioning that climate change is real and human-induced, is a key factor 
that leads to opposition. Furthermore, we employ structural equation models to account for 
interactions between the elite and general citizens. The results show that political actors who reject 
the idea of man-made climate change also oppose the promotion of a clean energy transition, and 
more generally that elite actors influence how citizens think about the issue. At the citizen level, an 
increase in climate change skepticism has a negative impact on levels of support for clean energy 
policy. The link is mainly determined by party affiliation. We conclude that potential strategies for 
achieving a clean energy transition should focus on motivating citizens because they generally seem 
to be less polarized and partisan, and thus less opposed to new solutions, than the elite, who tend to 
be more constrained in their actions. 
 
Key words: public policy; clean energy; opposition towards energy transitions; climate change 
skepticism; political elite 
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1. Introduction 
Most nation states need to adopt ambitious policies and substantially increase low-carbon energy 
production to achieve their climate goals and to reach a more sustainable long-term energy supply. 
Many experts of the field view state intervention as necessary for enabling a renewable energy transition 
because market failures as well as commitment and time inconsistency problems have thus-far limited 
the transition towards clean energy in areas without government support (Kern & Howlett, 2009; Lodge 
& Wegrich, 2012). Another factor impeding the transition to renewable energy includes the fact that 
parts of the political elite (political parties, E-NGOs, administrative offices, interest groups etc.) oppose 
policies that promote or implement clean energy, especially if they find clean energy neither desirable 
nor necessary (see also Fraune & Knodt, 2018 in this special issue [Fraune, Cornelia & Michèle Knodt. 
Sustainable energy transformations in an age of populism, post-truth politics, and local resistance. 
Energy Research and Social Science 2018: 43]). Moreover, on a systems level, scholars find that well-
established socio-technical (Bijker, Hughes, & Pinch, 2005; Geels, 2002; Sovacool, 2016; Sovacool & 
Geels, 2016) and regulatory systems (Stirling, 2014; Thelen, 1999), like the ones governing energy 
production and use, tend to be stable and hard to change over time. Finally, political actors and citizens 
alike are often unsure about what specific policies to implement, because of the diversity of options and 
the lack of clarity about policy outcomes (Kern & Howlett, 2009). All these factors may lead to 
substantial delays in the implementation of promotional measures and the deployment of new 
technologies, which could mean that countries struggling with these issues miss their respective climate 
and clean energy targets (Karlstrøm & Ryghaug, 2014; Kuzemko, Keating, & Goldthau, 2016). 
Transition studies have paid considerable attention to the stability of socio-technical systems. Public 
policy and environmental economics have mostly explored the uncertainty in policy selection. 
However, few studies explicitly analyze why certain groups of citizens or elite actors oppose policies 
supporting the transition towards a more sustainable energy system. The paper therefore asks: What 
drives elite actors and general citizens to oppose policies that support a clean energy transition? 
To achieve a clean energy transition, it is crucial that states and governments develop and work towards 
goals that include targets for clean energy production or lower greenhouse gas emissions. 
Simultaneously, researchers investigating reasons for success or failure of energy transitions need to 
focus on studying specific policies to better understand where opposition or support from the public 
comes from, similar to the value-action gap regarding the local siting of technologies (see also Graff et 
al., 2018 in this special issue [Graff, Michelle et al., 2018. Stakeholder Perceptions of the U.S. Energy 
Transition: Local-level Dynamics and Community Responses to National Politics and Policy. Energy 
Research and Social Science 2018: 43]; Bell, Gray, & Haggett, 2005). This paper, therefore, focuses on 
understanding the opposition to clean energy policies and uses it as a proxy for understanding support 
for the idea of a clean energy transition more broadly (Kern & Howlett, 2009). This study adopts an 
actor-centered perspective and considers the beliefs and preferences of both the political elite as well as 
general citizens because both play important roles in the legislative process as well as in the later 
implementation of clean energy policies, as (e.g.) Delina and Janetos (2018) or Komendantova, Riegler, 
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and Neumueller (2018) show. We thus consider the previous findings and expand the literature by 
explicitly combining research on both the elite and general citizenry. Understanding the root of 
opposition towards a clean energy policy is important to identify hurdles and solutions for states in 
achieving or reformulating their targets in accordance with the preferences of the political elite or 
citizens. Moreover, even when a productive policy does pass, when the public or political elite do not 
support it, compliance can still be low and undercut the policy’s efficacy (see also Trotter & Maconachie, 
2018 in this special issue [Trotter, Philipp Andrew & Roy Maconachie, 2018. Populism, post-truth 
politics and the failure to deceive the public in Uganda's energy debate. Energy Research and Social 
Science 2018: 43]; Dermont, Ingold, Kammermann, & Stadelmann-Steffen, 2017; Ingold, Stadelmann-
Steffen, & Kammermann, 2017).  
By exploring the root cause of opposition to clean energy policies from both the public and political 
elite, we expand current social science research on energy transitions. Stokes and Breetz (2018) as well 
as Carley, Evans, and Konisky (2018), for example, assessed the attitudes and culture specific to people 
affected by the expansion of RE and the decline of conventional power sources. They found that both 
attitudes and culture could drive people’s opposition to policies that promote sustainable energy. To 
develop a unique perspective on the subject, we combine their insights with literature on climate change 
skepticism (see e.g., McCright, Marquart-Pyatt, Shwom, Brechin, & Allen, 2016; Reiner et al., 2006; 
Tranter & Booth, 2015), which also seems to be a driving factor in determining whether the public and 
elite actors oppose a clean energy transition. Climate change skepticism is the belief that climate change 
either is not as problematic as the scientific community says it is, an altogether denial of anthropogenic 
climate change, or somewhere in between. Therefore, people can use their skepticism as grounds for 
rejecting tangible solutions to solving climate change, including supporting a clean energy transition. 
In addition, political parties and thought-leaders can continue fostering this skepticism by exploiting 
growing public distrust towards the scientific community and the government for political gain. 
Therefore, rhetoric that promotes the distrust of scientific facts and sows doubt in anthropogenic climate 
change can play into a populist mindset. If the frame used by the opposition is that “the government” 
and “scientists” are trying to force “the people” to live their lives a certain way with no true benefit to 
them, the result can be deep-seeded antagonism (Mudde, 2004) and further distrust not only of climate 
change but also of the government and scientific community more broadly. In Switzerland and other 
countries, the right-wing and populist parties tend to promote climate change skepticism and harbor 
deeper opposition towards clean energy than their more progressive counterparts. Populist parties, 
therefore, could be exploiting skepticism to further undermine public and political support for clean 
energy policies (Tranter & Booth, 2015).  
By combining insights from these strands of research, this paper expands on the current debate and 
increases the understanding of the complex and multi-level participatory processes concerning the clean 
energy transition. This paper focuses on Switzerland, which is ideal for three reasons: first, Switzerland 
is often seen as a laboratory for popular votes. This paper thus offers insight for other countries and 
regions that may rely on similar participatory processes involving both elite actors and citizens, 
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especially when these processes are generally new or specific to the energy sector (Linder, 2010; 
Szulecki, 2017). Second, Switzerland’s direct democratic system allows citizens to actively participate in 
the political decision-making process regarding the deployment of low-carbon technologies. There is a 
balance of power between the political elite (e.g., parties, interest groups, or environmental non-
governmental organizations (E-NGOs)) and citizens. That, in turn, allows us to investigate the political 
relevance and relative influence of both entities (Vatter, 2016). In our case, the elite is mainly in charge 
of the drafting phase, however, the citizens are later able to express their opposition or support for the 
new energy strategy in a popular vote. Third, the pressure to transition the electric power supply 
towards more low-carbon technologies is high in Switzerland because, in 2017, the country set 
ambitious short-term policy measures to support the transition (Swiss Confederation, 2016). By voting 
in favor of the 2017 energy act, the Swiss people accepted two primary policies regarding the production 
of electricity: a ban on constructing new nuclear power plants, and a gradual increase of taxes levied on 
electricity consumption to be used for subsidizing RE (among the more general goals within the policy 
were to increase RE production and energy efficiency). In order to achieve these goals, however, 
Switzerland needs to adopt additional policies. Because this first slate of policies, as well as the idea of 
bringing on additional policies, is both controversially discussed, Switzerland is an ideal test-case for 
exploring opposition towards the clean energy transition.  
On the theoretical level, we consider the attitudes and policy preferences of both elite actors and the 
citizenry as they pertain to clean energy policies (Converse, 1964). We also consider literature on social 
acceptance (Dermont et al., 2017; Jegen & Philion, 2017). For the elite actors, we apply cluster analyses 
(Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011; Murtagh & Legendre, 2014). Cluster analyses allow us to identify 
not only single actors and their opposition to the promotion of energy transitions, but also the attitudes 
of whole groups of actors based on their central beliefs. On the individual level, we apply structural 
equation modeling to assess and identify the factors that influence opposition to clean energy policies 
(Beaujean, 2014; Rosseel, 2012). The data used for the analysis is based on a survey conducted among 
elite actors in the energy policy domain as well as on data from a nationally-representative survey 
questioning citizens about their preferences regarding RE policy. By combining both sources, we 
present a comprehensive account of why elite actors and citizens alike often oppose clean energy 
policies.  
 
2. Theory 
2.1. Policy supporting energy transitions 
This paper focuses on the drivers behind opposition to renewable energy policy by both the political 
elite and general public. Most experts agree that a clean energy transition can only be successful when 
supported by state intervention (Kern & Howlett, 2009; Lodge & Wegrich, 2012). The range of policy 
options to accomplish such a goal is broad: they range from highly regulated, like banning nuclear 
power or implementing a feed-in tariff scheme, to those that are less prescriptive and more targeted 
such as subsidizing research and development of clean energy options (for an extensive list of measures 
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see Sovacool, 2009). Public support, as well as the support of the political elite, is a central prerequisite 
for success. Political parties, interest groups, and E-NGOs play an important role in the drafting phase 
of most energy policies, as do administrative entities and local governments. Political parties make the 
final determination about policy selection, unless a policy makes it to a public vote (at least in the Swiss 
case under investigation in this study). Although policy selection and a potential public vote are 
sequentially independent from each other and follow different rules, they are interrelated (Vatter, 2016). 
For instance, policymakers are susceptible to public opinion, and political parties play a role in shaping 
public opinion by providing heuristics (Kriesi, 2008).  
Most studies that have attempted to analyze the development of clean energy policy have been 
conducted under the frame of “social acceptance.” Dermont et al. (2017) further emphasize the political 
nature of social acceptance, since most processes used to promote clean energy policies are inherently 
political in nature. Policy decisions follow the rules of political institutions such as parliaments, citizens’ 
assemblies, or popular votes (Jegen & Philion, 2017; Scherhaufer, Höltinger, Salak, Schauppenlehner, & 
Schmidt, 2017). Elite stakeholders are crucial during the process of designing policies, but citizens 
become important actors later in the process when, in a direct-democratic setting, a public vote is 
triggered on the issue.  
 
2.2. Opposition by elite actors 
The policy preferences of elite actors are determined by two major factors (among others): their beliefs 
(e.g., Converse, 1964), and the preferences of the people or entities they represent (especially their 
political parties) (e.g., Schneider & Ingram, 1993). The beliefs of elite actors build the basis for their 
actions, influence with whom they collaborate, and determine what policies (if any) they choose for 
solving a problem (in this case the promotion of clean energy) (Converse, 1964; Weible & Sabatier, 2005). 
Their policy preferences – more detailed expressions about what specific policies should be used and 
which shouldn’t, as compared to whether or not any renewable energy policies should be pursued in 
the first place – tend complement these beliefs (Weible & Jenkins-Smith, 2016). Weible (2006) showed, 
in an empirical study, that even when political players are making choices about protecting marine 
areas, their decisions are impacted by their more general beliefs outside of the conservation realm. Kriesi 
and Jegen (2001) further show that beliefs also play a crucial role in the selection of energy related 
policies in the consensus oriented system of Switzerland. The paper thus adopts this hierarchical beliefs 
structure and considers actors to be boundedly rational in line with other frameworks such as the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (Weible, 2006).  
Other factors besides beliefs and preferences also influence the decisions of political elite. For instance, 
political elite may express opposition to a policy as a quid-pro-quo exchange with other actors (e.g., 
Ingold, Fischer, & Cairney, 2016), or because of other political priorities in tight budgetary situations 
(Howlett & Lejano, 2012). While we acknowledge the importance of these other aspects, however, this 
paper focuses primarily on the two previously described factors.  
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2.3. Opposition by citizens 
Many studies have analyzed citizen support for environmental issues at the polls, both in Switzerland 
(Bornstein & Thalmann, 2008; Stadelmann-Steffen, 2011), and in the U.S. (Deacon & Shapiro, 1975; Kahn 
& Matsusaka, 1995). Those studies offer insights into the factors that affect public support for clean 
energy policies. For instance, the public is generally sensitive to whether or not they will be personally 
impacted by a certain policy. In direct democratic processes, citizens can directly influence policy 
outcomes by voting against such policies, therefore asking to consider the specific context of popular 
votes if interested in the reaction of citizens towards the policies implementing (Dermont et al., 2017). 
Similar to elite actors, the individual attitudes of citizens influence their voting behavior. For example, 
if a citizen values environmental protection and public goods, they are more likely to vote for 
conservation-minded policies. In California, Deacon and Shapiro (1975) and Kahn and Matsusaka (1995) 
found such findings and reported that alignment with the Republican Party depressed voter support 
for conservation policies. By contrast, in Switzerland, a left-green ideology has been shown to 
significantly increase the probability that a citizen will vote in favor of an environmentally-friendly 
proposal (Bornstein & Thalmann, 2008; Sciarini, Bornstein, & Lanz, 2007). Similar results were found 
for more general environmental attitudes as well (Stadelmann-Steffen, 2011).1 These insights from 
literature referring to popular votes inform us about possible determinants of reactions by citizens 
towards proposals by the government where they have a say in voting decisions, and therefore quite 
explicit political process of acceptance, which does not necessarily reflect the multitude of determinants 
to other forms of acceptance in the literature (Dermont et al., 2017; see also Bell et al., 2005; Huijts, Molin 
& Steg 2012; Fast, 2013). Besides the focus on such political decisions for individuals, the next subchapter 
introduces a new perspective towards votes not discussed in the literature on voting on the environment 
so far, that is gaining in urgency and trending in political debate, as new aspect. 
 
2.4. Climate change perception 
In recent years the research community has honed in on the fact that climate change skepticism – and 
especially doubt in anthropogenic climate change in particular – is very likely to correspond with an 
individual’s view that a clean energy transition is unnecessary (Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014; Engels, 
Hüther, Schäfer, & Held, 2013; Lee, Markowitz, Howe, Ko, & Leiserowitz, 2015; McCright et al., 2016; 
Shi, Visschers, & Siegrist, 2015). As aforementioned, both the political elite and citizens are likely to 
evaluate an issue like a specific energy policy based on their pre-existing beliefs, political ideologies, 
and environmental attitudes. Notably, a person’s perception and knowledge of climate change 
significantly impacts their judgment about the importance of phasing out conventional energy sources 
and investing in renewable energy, as well as their willingness to support environmental policies (Lee 
et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2015). Most importantly, as Shi et al. (2015, 2194 & 2197) found in Switzerland, the 
more citizens recognize the causes and impacts of climate change, the more likely they are to support 
                                                          
1 In the following, we use ‘beliefs’ for the elite level and ‘attitudes’ for the citizens’ level.  
7 
and accept climate-friendly policies. Moreover, public opinion on climate change is heavily influenced 
by the political elite, as Brulle, Carmichael, and Jenkins (2012) have shown in the U.S. In fact, compared 
to several other factors like the prominence of extreme weather events and more scientific information, 
cues from the political elite, like policymakers, advocacy groups, and the media, are the most prominent 
drivers of public opinion on climate change issues (Brulle et al., 2012, p. 182). The political elite, 
therefore, are a relevant factor in determining public opinion and thus public support (or lack thereof) 
for clean energy policies (see Kriesi, 2008 for direct democratic voting heuristics). This is even truer 
given that recent research demonstrates that simply stating that climate change is man-made is likely 
to increase opposition from individuals who doubt the scientific consensus (Bolsen & Druckman, 
Forthcoming). A similar reaction is conceivable for skeptic political actors when presented with 
additional scientific information (Cairney, 2016). 
Therefore, an individual’s pre-existing attitudes towards the environment and climate change are 
strong factors as to whether or not they will support specific clean energy policies, for both the political 
elite and the general citizenry (Shi et al., 2015). Brulle et al. (2012) show that the political elite influence 
public support for climate change issues, and beg the question of whether or not political parties 
deliberately use climate skepticism to reinforce opposition to clean energy policies. As climate change 
skepticism refers to questioning scientists and their work, it also reflects a skepticism or distrust towards 
“the elite” and “the educated”. This distrust of the elite or a group different from the own, in this case 
highly educated scientists, reflects the essence of populism establishing an antagonism between the 
people and an elitist group (Mudde, 2004). In this analysis, we will therefore take a closer look at how 
beliefs in climate change, both for the elite and for the general public, influences thinking around energy 
policy, and how this new explanation fares in comparison to older explanations.  
 
2.5. Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical understandings, we formulate three assumptions that guide our analysis (see 
Figure 1). Multiple studies show that general beliefs about an issue influence the policy preferences of 
both the elite and the citizenry (Kriesi & Jegen, 2001; Weible, 2006). Recently, research also highlights 
that beliefs, attitudes, and concerns about climate change have an effect on the public’s support and 
acceptance of policies supporting a clean energy transition (Capstick & Pidgeon, 2014; Engels et al., 
2013; Shi et al., 2015; Tranter & Booth, 2015). Therefore, our first hypothesis is that for both the elite and 
for citizens, climate change skepticism drives opposition to renewable energy policies:  
 
H1a:  For political elite, skepticism about anthropogenic climate change coincides with opposition to clean energy 
policies. 
 
H1b: For general citizens, skepticism about anthropogenic climate change coincides with opposition to clean 
energy policies. 
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We also take into account that political actors and citizens have different tasks to accomplish during a 
political process (Dermont et al., 2017). Political actors, and especially political parties, are in charge of 
drafting policy and formally adopting them in parliament. If a referendum is later triggered, citizens 
have to vote on that policy. However, we recognize that those two processes do not develop 
independently. Rather, political parties and citizens interact during both the policy development and a 
public vote (Brulle et al., 2012; Kriesi, 2008). With this in mind, and acknowledging that political 
ideology and heuristics about climate change impact support for  new policy, we will test two additional 
assumptions: First, we assume that the political elite, namely political parties, influence how citizens 
perceive climate change; hence, H2 supposes that political parties skeptic about climate change transfer 
those beliefs to their voters. Second, we assume in H3 that political parties influence their voters’ 
opposition to clean energy policies by offering decision heuristics.  
 
H2: The political elite, namely political parties influence how citizens perceive climate change.  
 
H3: Political ideology influences the public’s support or opposition to clean energy policies.  
 
 
Figure 1: Graphic presentation of the hypotheses. H1 symbolizes the connection between the elite’s and citizens’ beliefs and 
opposition towards policies supporting an energy transition; H2 indicates the connection between the elite (especially political 
parties) and citizens’ perception; H3 indicates how the elite (especially political parties) influence citizens’ opposition through 
party ideology.  
 
3. Research Design  
3.1. Case  
Since the early 2000s, Switzerland has had a strong climate mitigation strategy that was reinforced when 
they signed the COP21 treaty (Ingold et al., 2016). In 2017, Switzerland adopted an ambitious new 
energy strategy that contained additional goals regarding renewable energy production and energy 
efficiency standards. From a policy perspective, the most impactful piece of the new energy act is a ban 
on new construction of nuclear power plants, which was first proposed shortly after the Fukushima 
incident (Sager, 2014; Swiss Confederation, 2016). This ban effectively prevents energy companies from 
replacing their current nuclear power plants and is equivalent to a nuclear phase-out by 2035. The other 
major piece of the new energy act is an increase in the tax levied on electricity consumption, which then 
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goes towards funding renewable energy promotion (feed-in tariff). Further implementation is partly 
delegated to the sub-national level (cantons) due to the federal setup (Sager, 2014; Vatter, 2016). The 
investigation both on elite and individual level is embedded in this context of the new energy act and 
its further implementation. Thus both the elite (drafting) and the citizens (popular vote) are confronted 
with the issue of the Swiss energy transition.  
 
3.2. Data  
We collected data for this paper by two means. First, we conducted a survey among the political elite 
after the completion of the consultation for the new energy act. The consultation procedure is a process 
where all political actors (parties, cantons, E-NGOs, economic associations etc.) can formally issue their 
support or opposition for a specific legal act and suggest modifications to the proposed legal text. To 
structure this process, the federal department in charge of the respective consultation procedure 
distributes a preliminary version of the new act among all actors relevant to the process and requests 
the actors to respond. Based on the participants in the consultation process, 42 actors were selected for 
the survey based on the approaches (reputational, decisional & positional) suggested by Pappi and 
Henning (1998): First, we assessed all actors participating in the consultation procedures whether they 
were in a formal position during the decision process and were able to actively vote on the output 
(positional approach) and whether they tried to enter their ideas and interests into the decision process 
(i.e. participation in the consultation procedure; decisional approach). Furthermore, with the 
questionnaire we asked all actors who they consider important in the process (reputational approach). 
We then cross-referenced all three approaches and received a final list of relevant actors.  
In the survey, elite actors were asked to express their general beliefs and preferences about how to 
achieve a more sustainable energy system.2 The survey participants included all political parties that 
were able to form a faction in the national parliament on their own in 2014 (at least five representatives 
are needed), relevant economic interest groups and interest groups specific to the energy sector, E-
NGOs and utilities, and actors from science and administrative entities. The response rate to the survey 
was 79 percent. Actors that did not answer the survey responded that they did not have an official 
position towards the new energy act or had their interests represented by another actor.3 
Second, we gathered data from the public using a representative survey conducted in spring 2016 in 
Switzerland in three languages (German, French and Italian). Individuals were invited by postal mail 
to participate in an online survey, whereby 8,287 individuals accepted the invitation (42.7% response 
rate). From this group, a random subsample of 1,985 respondents were prompted to answer questions 
about policy measures they would support to help the cantons implement the newly adopted energy 
targets. These measures ranged from financial support for renewable energy production, to restrictions 
on non-renewable energy sources, to supporting information and consultation opportunities, to no 
measures at all. The measures are detailed in Table 3 in the Annex. The survey sample populations did 
                                                          
2 A list of all survey items is included in Table 3 in the Annex.  
3 A list of all participating actors including their actor type is depicted in Table 2 in the Annex. 
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not deviate from the general population in demographic, structural, or political composition, which is 
likely due to the high-quality representative sample provided by the Federal Office of Statistics. 
 
3.3. Methods 
Elite level  
First, we used a cluster analysis to identify actor groups with shared beliefs. Actors are divided into 
clusters that within themselves are as homogeneous as possible, whereas the different clusters should 
be as heterogeneous as possible (Murtagh & Legendre, 2014). Cluster analysis is well suited to capture 
different groups of actors within the sector based on their beliefs and preferences. With clustering, we 
are furthermore able to distinguish between subgroups of actors that may oppose or support policies 
for a clean energy transition based on different reasons. We thus applied agglomerative hierarchical 
clustering using the complete linkage method. Even though the data is not strictly hierarchical, we 
believe that hierarchical clustering is an adequate approach because it is a good system for handling 
small data sets. Moreover, hierarchical clustering generates a ‘tree’ (displayed in a dendrogram) that 
allows for a comprehensive assessment of the structures within the clusters.  
We preferred the complete link method over single links because the former is less prone to outliers 
that occur due to actors’ distinct beliefs regarding a single subject (Fonseca, 2012). The stems/heights of 
the hierarchical model are unweighted because the selected beliefs are considered equally relevant for 
the differentiation of the clusters. We determined the final number of clusters based on case knowledge 
(Everitt et al., 2011). We then tested cluster validity by partitioning the data in subsets to check whether 
the clusters stay the same with less actors, and by checking whether single variables disproportionately 
affected the assignment of specific actors to any given cluster (Halkidi, Batistakis, & Vazirgiannis, 2001). 
We later aggregated specific beliefs and policy preferences by cluster in order to assess what beliefs 
about renewable energy the actor groups were trying to assert. We also briefly discuss the validity of 
the clusters using different approaches. The supplementary material includes more detailed 
information regarding the internal and external validity and robustness of the analyses. 
 
Citizen level 
On the individual level, we estimated opposition towards policies that support a clean energy 
transition, including tax reductions, subsidies, bans on non-RE, public interventions, or information 
dissemination. We used structural equation modeling to analyze both how political ideology impacts 
beliefs and attitudes towards nature and climate, as well as how those impact an individual’s support 
(or lack thereof) for corresponding policies (Beaujean, 2014; Rosseel, 2012). A structural equation model 
allowed us to estimate two things. First, the estimation of latent variables based on several observed 
items. For example, climate change skepticism, which is a score compiled from four items reflecting 
several aspects of climate change skepticism, is such a latent variable representing a theoretical 
construct measured through four items. The same approach applies for opposition towards the 
promotion of energy transitions (six items) and environmental attitudes (two items). Second, a 
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structural equation model runs multiple regressions at the same time, thereby allowing us to 
simultaneously analyze the influence of ideology on climate change skepticism, and the influence of 
those two concepts on opposition towards policy.  
We fully documented the empirical analysis in the supplementary material, in which we also listed 
additional measures of the validity of items, comprehensive model results, and test scores in detail.  
 
3.4. Operationalization 
The dependent variable for the elite as well as the citizenry is opposition towards clean energy policies. 
The measures included in this paper were selected based on a qualitative analysis of the policy process 
that led to the adoption of the new energy law. During the process of the new energy law being adopted, 
multiple policies were discussed, including a nuclear phase-out, increasing support for energy research, 
increasing a pre-existing electricity tax, or putting in place a CO2-tax compensation. The most relevant 
measures were then included in the elite survey, in which actors were able to specify whether they 
agreed, rather agreed, rather disagreed, or disagreed with the adoption of a policy. On the individual 
level, respondents were asked which policy should be introduced in order to promote a clean energy 
transition, and they had the option to check all policies of which they approved.  
The beliefs used for clustering the elite actors were compiled by asking them whether they agreed, 
rather agreed, rather disagreed, or disagreed with certain statements regarding the transformation of 
the electricity sector. The statements included those that corresponded with the following values: 
economic efficiency, free market, social justice, environmental concerns and prioritization of RE over 
landscape protection, security of supply, and energy independence. The beliefs/values were then coded 
on a scale from 1 to 4 where 1 corresponded to ‘disagree’ and 4 to ‘agree.’ The preferences of each actor 
were then aggregated for each previously-identified cluster. A full list of beliefs used for clustering can 
be found in Table 3 in the Annex.  
For the individual data, the models considered party preference, i.e., the party the individual voted for 
in the 2015 election, climate change skepticism and general environmental attitudes as main 
independent variables. The model included several control variables such as age (both linear and 
quadratic), gender, language, region, education, and income. The variables are described in more detail 
in Table 4 in the Annex. For more details on the operationalization conducted in this paper, see the 
extended documentation. 
 
4. Analysis  
4.1. Opposition on the elite level 
Our first analysis sought to understand whether opposition to policies supporting a clean energy 
transitions from members of the elite coincides with climate change skepticism. We used the complete 
linkage method and agglomerative hierarchical clustering to identify four clusters among the elite actors 
working in renewable energy policy in Switzerland. The first cluster includes a rather large group of 
actors centered on the center-right Christian Democrats (CVP), the Social Democrats (SPD), and the 
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Green-liberal Party (GLP). Also included in the cluster are the responsible ministry of Environment and 
Energy (UVEK) as well as most actors representing science and parts of the RE industry. This group of 
actors has been supportive of a clean energy transition but also showed restraint in that they did not 
promote particularly strict policy instruments during the drafting or advocacy process (‘pro’ cluster). 
The most supportive group of actors came from the Green Party (GPS) and all questioned E-NGOs, as 
well as the business association representing the solar industry (SSOLAR). These actors mostly favored 
an extensive promotion of clean energy and a rather short-term nuclear phase-out (‘very-pro’ cluster). 
The dendrogram identifies another rather large group of actors led by the Liberal Party (FDP) that 
contains the major electricity producers (BKW, VSE) and the largest economic interest association, 
economiesuisse (ECON). Most of these actors were split on the matter of promoting a clean energy 
transition, as well as on whether to support the final version of the new energy act. The FDP came very 
close to opposing the act during the referendum, whereas economiesuisse stayed neutral, as it was not 
able to identify a position that satisfied a majority of its members. Both organizations remained skeptical 
of the policy and opposed major parts of the act during the parliamentary phase, primarily due to their 
economic concerns (‘semi-anti’ cluster). The fourth cluster contains the populist right-wing Swiss 
People’s Party (SVP) and actors from the nuclear energy sector. These actors were the most likely to 
oppose the nuclear phase-out, the promotion of renewable energy, and more generally the transition 
towards a more sustainable energy sector (‘anti’ cluster). This last cluster is also the only group of actors 
that did not believe that climate change is man-made, although they did not question the idea that the 
climate is changing, per se. All other groups of actors consider anthropogenic climate change to be real. 
The different clusters identified are depicted in Figure 2.  
Choosing four clusters for analysis allowed us to be the most accurate both theoretically and 
contextually. Raising the number of clusters to five or six would have artificially complicated the 
interpretation because the additional clusters would not have been clearly distinguishable from the four 
we presented. Similarly, if we had lowered the number of clusters to three or two, important contextual 
differences between actors would have been omitted. We also tested the clusters for their validity by 
randomly splitting the actors into two different subsets and conducting the same analysis (see 
supplementary material for documentation). Furthermore, beliefs were removed one-by-one from the 
model in order to check whether a single belief was able to alter the assembled clusters. Neither checks 
for validity returned significantly different results.4  
The analysis showed that only one cluster of the four prescribed to the idea that climate change is not 
caused by human activity. This ‘anti’-cluster also opposed most measures promoting a clean energy 
transition. As depicted in Figure 3, the anti-cluster is the only group of actors that clearly opposes a 
nuclear phase-out, whereas all other groups of actors fully or partially support a phase-out. The second 
major measure adopted within the new energy act was the increase of a tax levied on electricity used 
for a feed-in tariff for renewable energy. Here the preferences of the semi-anti cluster differed in 
                                                          
4 More detailed information regarding the internal and external validity as well as further checks for robustness such as (e.g.) 
item sampling, and the use of different clustering algorithms can be found in the supplementary material. 
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comparison to their preferences for the nuclear phase-out; the semi-anti cluster opposed a raise of the 
current tax, in sharp contrast to the two pro-clusters. No other distinct preferences could be identified 
that separate the clusters as starkly as did these policies. 
Based on our analyses, we were able to validate Hypothesis 1a, which assumes that, on the elite level, 
climate change skepticism coincides with opposition towards a clean energy transition and related 
policies. We also determined that other beliefs, such as economic concerns (especially in the case of the 
semi-anti cluster) might also have an impact on opposition to clean energy policies.  
 
 
Figure 2: Elite actor clusters based on hierarchical agglomerative clustering. A list of actors is presented in Table 2 in the Annex.  
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Figure 3: Elite preferences for policies considered in the new energy act including standard deviations. Reading example: The 
“anti” cluster of the elite completely disagrees with nuclear phase-out, but supports research on renewables, with some actors 
more in favor than others are. The point denotes the group mean, the interval the mean +/- the standard error per group. 
 
4.2. Opposition on the citizen’s level 
In this section, we first analyze whether the elite do, in fact, have an influence on the public’s perception 
of climate change (H2). Second and third, we assess whether climate change skepticism and political 
ideology influence the public’s support or opposition for renewable energy policies (H1b & H3).  
Before addressing these hypotheses, we must answer the question of whether or not the elite and 
individuals share the same preferences regarding energy policies yet to be developed. Based on the 
clusters presented in section 4.1, individuals are grouped in the same clusters based on the party they 
voted for in the last national election. Figure 4 shows their support for four main policies, which were a 
part of the new energy act. Notably, Figure 4 shows that agreement with the policy goals is relatively 
consistent with more environmentally-friendly beliefs by elite clusters. Therefore, individuals and the 
elite are exhibiting similar and parallel preferences. However, in direct comparison with Figure 3 in 
section 4.1, individuals show less opposition towards policies across the board than the elite, and are 
generally less polarized than their elite counterpoints. Therefore, individuals seem to exhibit more 
willingness to compromise and recognize both the benefits and drawbacks of energy policy as 
compared to the political elite.  
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Figure 4: Policies in the new energy act and support by individuals, grouped by clusters based on elite belief. Reading example: 
see Figure 3. The point denotes the group mean, the interval the mean +/- the standard error per group. 
 
However, does elite positioning on subjects such as the environment and climate change also influence 
how individuals perceive these issues, such as Brulle et al. (2012) find for the U.S. and as stated in H3? 
To answer this question, we estimated a structural equation model, which also addressed how political 
ideology influences beliefs and attitudes about the environment generally and climate change more 
specifically. Figure 5 demonstrates how the model was constructed (without control variables). 
Structural equation modeling allows for multiple simultaneous regressions, considering that some 
variables are both dependent and independent variables in those regressions. For example, in the 
present analysis, climate change skepticism is regressed on party preference and environmental 
attitudes, while also serving as an independent variable in a regression estimating opposition.  
 
 
Figure 5: Setup of the structural equation model, including the latent variables (ellipses) and the observed values (rectangles). 
Reading example: climate change skepticism, a latent variable as per the elliptic representation, is estimated by four items, 
represented by the four rectangles cc1-cc4. Climate change skepticism is considered a dependent variable in a regression, with 
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party preference and environmental attitudes as independent variables (the incoming arrows), and is considered an independent 
variable in a regression estimating opposition.  
The results are documented in Table 1, Table 5 in the Annex, and depicted in Figure 6. The indicators 
(RMSEA = .032, SRMR = .032, CFI = .908) suggest a satisfactory fit of the model. Regarding the results 
of the model, first, political ideology reflected through party preference correlated with all three latent 
variables - environmental attitudes, climate change skepticism, and opposition. Compared to the 
reference category without party preference, Left-Green political ideology (preference for SP, GPS or 
GLP) is positively correlated with higher concern for the environment, while liberal and conservative 
respondents (FDP, SVP) have lower levels of conservation-mindedness. Preference for the CVP, 
currently the leading party in energy policy as they hold the office of the energy minister, does not 
coincide with environmental attitudes significantly different from the general population. Both party 
preference and environmental attitude are linked with climate change skepticism: again, Left-Green 
political ideology goes hand in hand with lower climate change skepticism. On the other hand, 
respondents with a preference for the SVP have significantly higher climate change skepticism. 
Conservation-minded and pro-environmental attitudes are negatively correlated with climate change 
skepticism.  
The results suggest that climate change skepticism is influenced by political ideology, as argued by 
Brulle et al. (2012). In addition to the influence of political ideology, individuals with lower educational 
background and income are more skeptical about climate change. Lastly, respondents from the French-
speaking part of the country are more skeptical about anthropogenic climate change than those from 
German-speaking areas (see Table 1).  
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Regressions Estimate Std. Err z-value P > |z| 
Environmental Attitudes ~     
  Party preference (ref. other/none)     
  SVP -.447 .105 -4.261 .000 
  SP .376 .100 3.752 .000 
  CVP -.209 .111 -1.882 .060 
  FDP -.532 .106 -5.024 .000 
  GLP .479 .127 3.781 .000 
  GPS .858 .142 6.057 .000 
 Gender (female) .299 .065 4.585 .000 
 Income (ref. middle)     
  low income  .151 .087 1.731 .084 
  high income -.236 .075 -3.147 .002 
Climate Change Skepticism ~     
 Party preference (ref. other/none)     
  SVP .248 .058 4.292 .000 
  SP -.272 .051 -5.331 .000 
  CVP -.041 .059 -.700 .484 
  FDP -.017 .058 -.295 .768 
  GLP -.266 .070 -3.781 .000 
  GPS -.209 .071 -2.949 .003 
 Environmental Attitudes -.199 .024 -8.299 .000 
 Education (ref. middle)     
  low education .140 .042 3.322 .001 
  high education -.021 .047 -.456 .648 
 Income (ref. middle)     
  low income .108 .046 2.329 .020 
  high income -.121 .040 -3.041 .002 
Opposition ~     
 Party preference (ref. other/none)     
  SVP -.016 .016 -1.020 .308 
  SP -.070 .018 -3.814 .000 
  CVP -.010 .019 -.511 .609 
  FDP -.054 .017 -3.247 .001 
  GLP -.091 .027 -3.371 .001 
  GPS -.110 .027 -4.097 .000 
 Environmental Attitudes -.011 .007 -1.569 .117 
 Climate Change Skepticism .069 .013 5.199 .000 
N   1’627 
Degrees of freedom   180 
P-value (Chi-square)   .000 
Robust Comparative Fit Index (CFI)   .908 
Robust Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA)   .032 
Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR)   .032 
 
Table 1: Structural equation model, regressions. Note: estimated in R with lavaan (Rosseel, 2012). Latent factors are presented in 
Table 5 in the Annex. Full results in the supplementary material.  
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Figure 6: Regression results of the structural equation model estimated with lavaan (Rosseel, 2012), with each column of results 
representing one regression within the structural equation model with the dependent variable denoted at the head. Full results 
in Table 1, and Table 5 in the Annex. Reading example: the last column depicts the estimation of opposition towards clean energy 
policies. The mean effect, depicted as a point, in the regression for climate change skepticism on opposition is at .069 and therefore 
demonstrates a positive correlation between higher skepticism and more opposition towards clean energy policy. The line 
represents the 95% confidence interval. 
 
Having established a relationship between political ideology, represented by party preference, and 
climate change skepticism, the next step is to look at how both could be heuristics that inform attitudes 
towards clean energy policies. As the results in Figure 6 also show, climate change skepticism does 
indeed increase opposition towards new clean energy policies. In fact, the final regression suggests that 
climate change skepticism is significantly correlated with higher opposition to these policy instruments, 
corroborating Shi et al. (2015). How individuals think about climate change and whether they believe 
in it is related to their opposition for pro-renewable policies; the more skeptical the respondent, the 
more strongly opposed they were to clean energy policies. Although anthropogenic climate change is 
scientific fact, respondents’ beliefs still coincide with their readiness to oppose renewable energy, which 
suggests that climate change skepticism influences voting behavior on these issues. 
We noticed one distinct discrepancy, however, while more closely examining the relationship between 
party predisposition, climate change skepticism, and support for clean energy policies: for the populist 
right, party preference and opposition towards renewable energy policy did not correlate, i.e., no direct 
correlation. Respondents who preferred the SVP did not differ from the general citizen in their support 
for energy policy. However, we did find that those respondents are more skeptical about climate 
change, which is linked with a significantly higher opposition, i.e., an indirect correlation. Climate 
change skepticism, which is strongly influenced by the political elite, according to Brulle et al. (2012), 
could thus serve as a tool for this party to incite opposition to renewable energy policy. On the other 
side, though, a pre-existing belief in climate change can benefit the Left-Green party and reinforce an 
individual’s support for both the party and clean energy policy.  
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To summarize, the political parties and their voters share similar attitudes towards environmental 
policies intended to mitigate climate change. Moreover, the results of our analysis suggest that political 
ideology shapes how citizens perceive climate change and its causes, corroborating the findings of 
Brulle et al. (2012) for the Swiss direct democratic context. Generally, we can assume that climate change 
skepticism does not influence which political party individuals associate with, but rather that party 
affiliation influences the strength of climate change skepticism or the belief in anthropogenic climate 
change. There are two reasons for this argument – because parties and affiliations with them are older 
than specific concerns about climate change, and because of the multi-issue reality of politics and voter 
concerns. For example, voters who associate with the Swiss Peoples’ Party, who show the strongest 
climate change skepticism, prescribe to a party that built its strength on immigration issues, not 
environmental concerns. In short, hypothesis 2, which suggests that the political elite influence how 
citizens think about climate change, can be supported in accordance with Brulle et al. (2012), and is most 
evident in the case of the populist right which is sowing skepticism about both climate change and 
science more broadly.  
Our research also validates hypotheses 1b and 3, which line up with the conclusions of prior research 
as well. Skepticism about the man-made nature of climate change, as postulated by Shi et al. (2015), 
does indeed correlate with opposition to clean energy policy, the result being that the most skeptical 
people are also the most oppositional to climate action, which supports hypothesis 1b. Political ideology 
itself, as suggested in hypothesis 3 and represented through party preference, is also directly linked 
with opposition, most evidently in the reduced opposition to clean energy policy for those that associate 
with liberal or Left-Green ideologies.  
 
5. Discussion  
The models reveal that beliefs and attitudes, and climate change skepticism in particular, are important 
factors in explaining opposition to clean energy policies for both the political elite and citizenry. For the 
elite, this can be attributed to the belief that an RE transition is not desirable or necessary because climate 
change is not the top priority, or a priority at all, among actors voicing opposition. In Switzerland, the 
populist Swiss People’s Party SVP is the only major party skeptic of climate change, and is the sole 
outspoken party opponent of the new energy act. The nuclear industry and the Swiss Homeowner 
Association (at the time of the survey presided by an MP of the SVP) are the other strong opponents of 
the policy. All other major political actors, including the current electricity producers and free-market 
FDP, accept human-made climate change as a fact and support a general transition towards RE. 
However, the results have to be taken with caution, as the analysis applied to better understand the 
political elite does not allow for direct causal conclusions.  
For individuals within the citizenry, the results suggest that the political elite do influence notions 
regarding climate-change skepticism, which in turn influences the public’s support for environmental 
policy. Moreover, climate change skepticism does seem to be a tool that the political elite can use to 
depress support for clean energy policy. The political elite, and especially those with close ties to 
20 
industry, are very cautious to support policies that may affect the economy. This conclusion is well 
illustrated by the ‘semi-anti’ cluster’s general approval of a nuclear phase-out but its rejection of a tax 
increase on electricity consumption. Because economic arguments against renewable energy may not 
be as impactful in discouraging support for climate policies, political actors within the elite are able to 
spread doubt about the necessity of clean energy by spreading doubt about climate change as a concept.  
The findings suggest that elite actors not only influence how citizens think about climate change, but 
also that political ideology is an important heuristic as to whether or not citizens reject clean energy 
policy more broadly. This suggests that climate change skepticism serves as a proxy influenced by 
political ideology, most substantially for the populist right. Speaking to the necessity of an energy 
transition and questioning the reality of climate change emotionalizes the debate and allows the party 
to not only undermine scientific consensus but also to push for less or no state-intervention at all. In this 
sense, nurturing climate skepticism pushes the public’s attention away from policy options to treat 
climate change, and instead focuses it on questions about whether climate change is even real in the 
first place.  
Given our results, more thorough investigations into the link between a party position with regards to 
climate change and its influence on the respective voters need to be conducted. The approach with an 
SEM establishes this link and also suggests, together with the theoretical discussion and insights from 
earlier literature, the influence of parties on climate change skepticism. However, the data structure at 
hand and the model can not go into the depths or the mechanisms of the relation between a parties’ 
position and a voters’ attitudes. As such, more research with regards to this relation could built on 
interviews with voters to highlight how this process of perception and attitudinal alignment works.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates factors that explain opposition in both the political elite and the public towards 
policies clean energy policies that support a renewable energy transition. The paper furthermore 
questions whether the attitudes of the political elite, notably political parties, influence the way citizens 
support climate and energy issues. In the analysis, climate change skepticism is identified as a sufficient 
but not necessary condition for the rejection of policies supporting clean energy. We also show that elite 
stakeholders project their beliefs and specifically their aversion to RE onto their voters and are an 
important source for decision heuristics. 
The paper’s findings are important to understanding the steps necessary to transition to a primarily 
renewable energy system. The public relies on cues received from elite actors (most notably parties). 
This gives the elite a major opportunity to influence public opinion and, therefore, votes. Moreover, 
climate change skepticism has been a trending issue within populist parties on the right (but not only, 
according to Brown, 2014). With the denial of climate change, populist parties are thus able to rally 
opposition against clean energy policies, similarly to the way in which they established political 
strength on immigration issues. Climate change skepticism can thus become an important and strong 
tool for political parties and elite to transfer their opposition to clean energy to voters. 
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Because elite actors play a central role in policy selection and influencing public opinion, they can be a 
massive hindrance towards pursuing a renewable energy transition. Elite actors and especially political 
parties that oppose the promotion of clean energy and promote climate skepticism are probably one of 
the most important hurdles to overcome if we are to transition to renewable energy. More generally, 
and independently from the Swiss direct-democratic system, some political actors seem to be exploiting 
climate change skepticism to incite public opposition to clean energy policy. It is, however, highly 
questionable whether these actors nourishing skepticism can be convinced to stop. In order to facilitate 
the process, political actors clearly in favor of a RE transition need to rethink how they approach citizens 
and what arguments they use to convince citizens that do not have strict preferences (see e.g., Stoknes, 
2014). Motivated reasoning could potentially provoke a backlash and further promote distrust in the 
government and in climate change (Bolsen & Druckman, Forthcoming). At the same time, scientists also 
need to rethink how they present evidence for anthropogenic climate change to political actors. Time 
and resources to process information are almost as limited for the political elite as they are for the public, 
and its possible scientific evidence may not make its way into political debate (Cairney, 2016).  
The differing results of our analysis for the elite and citizens illustrate how opinion is more ideologically 
polarized for the elite than for individuals. This might be because political actors and especially political 
parties need to have very distinct positions in order to capture citizens’ attention and support. 
Individuals, however, do not need to develop clearly distinguishable beliefs and are often more 
ambivalent regarding a specific issue unless they are immediately impacted by it. This conclusion 
suggests that solutions addressing climate change could be supported by individuals even if some elite 
actors categorically reject the idea.  
Lastly, it is important to acknowledge the interests and preferences of actors included in the ‘semi-anti’ 
cluster. As the somewhat platitudinous label for this group already indicates, these actors will probably 
oppose policies they consider too drastic. However, this paper also demonstrates that while the actors 
may oppose specific policies, they are not principally opposed to clean energy across the board. They 
are more likely to define their support or opposition depending on the selected policy and its specific 
implications. For states advocating for a clean energy transition, it is therefore essential to gain the 
support of this cluster of actors, in contexts both with and without direct-democratic options.  
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8. Annex 
 
Acronym Organization Actor Type 
   
AEE Organization for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Interest group (energy) 
AKADWISS Swiss Academies of Arts and Sciences Science 
AUTOS Swiss Automobile Association Interest group (economy) 
AVES Organization for Responsible Energy Policy Switzerland Interest group (energy) 
BKW BKW AG Utility company 
CVP Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland Political party 
DSV Swiss Association for Distribution System Operators Interest group (energy) 
ECON economiesuisse Interest group (economy) 
EDI Federal Department of Home Affairs Administration 
ELECTROS Association for Electrical Engineering, Power and Information Technologies Interest group (economy) 
ETH ETH Board Science 
FDP FDP.The Liberals Political party 
GLP Green Liberal Party of Switzerland Political party 
GPS Green Party of Switzerland Political party 
GREENP Greenpeace Switzerland Environmental NGO 
HEV Swiss Homeowner Association  Interest group (economy) 
INDUS ScienceIndustries - Swiss Business Association Chemistry Pharma Biotech Interest group (economy) 
NFORUM Nuclear Forum Switzerland Interest group (energy) 
PRONA ProNatura Environmental NGO 
PSI Paul Scherrer Institute Science 
SAB Swiss Working Group for Mountain Regions Regional association 
SATW Swiss Academy of Engineering Sciences Science 
SBV Swiss Farmers Union Interest group (economy) 
SES Swiss Energy Foundation Interest group (energy) 
SGB Federation of Trade Unions Trade union 
SGV Swiss Association for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Interest group (economy) 
SP Social Democratic Party of Switzerland Political party 
SSOLAR Swiss Trade Association for Solar Energy Swissolar Interest group (energy) 
SVP Swiss People's Party Political party 
TRAVS Travail Suisse Trade union 
UVEK Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communication Administration 
VSE Association of Swiss Electricity Companies  Interest group (energy) 
WWF WWF Switzerland Environmental NGO 
Table 2: List of elite actors  
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Belief Variable Min. Max. Mean Stdev Var 
Energy strategy 2050 in general stratsupport 1 4 2.848 0.870 0.758 
General nuclear phase-out besupport 1 4 3.030 1.185 1.405 
Lower energy and electricity consumption useredu 2 4 3.455 0.711 0.506 
Increase share of renewables renewincr 2 4 3.606 0.609 0.371 
Sustaining Swiss access to international markets maccess 2 4 3.515 0.566 0.320 
Reconstructing energy grid netwreconstr 2 4 3.455 0.617 0.381 
Support for sequential nuclear phase-out phaseout 1 4 3.273 1.126 1.267 
Increase international competitions intenscollab 1 4 3.515 0.755 0.570 
Banning construction of new nuclear power plants constrban 1 4 2.667 1.407 1.979 
Introduction of white certificates for utilities efftargets 1 4 2.182 1.044 1.091 
Explicit right for own use of electricity for 
individuals 
legalanchor 2 4 3.515 0.712 0.508 
Limit duration of feed-in tariff per installation kev 1 4 3.424 0.792 0.627 
Increase electricity tax for individuals cap 1 4 2.667 1.362 1.854 
Partial exemption of CO2 tax for utilities chargerelief 1 4 2.394 1.116 1.246 
Increase energy research research 2 4 3.606 0.556 0.309 
Ensure security of supply guarantsuppl 3 4 3.758 0.435 0.189 
Ensure international independence of Swiss 
energy sector 
sectautono 1 4 2.909 0.765 0.585 
Prioritize economic efficiency of the energy mix economix 2 4 3.182 0.808 0.653 
Ensure competitiveness of energy sector intcompet 2 4 3.727 0.517 0.267 
Ensure equal access possibilities for all 
individuals, independent from their social status 
equalaccess 1 4 3.121 0.857 0.735 
Ecological risk of prolonging permits for nuclear 
power plants 
lifespanext 1 4 2.424 1.324 1.752 
Prioritization of RE production over increasing 
energy efficiency 
renewpref 1 4 2.545 0.938 0.881 
Necessity to adapt to & mitigate climate change climtargets 1 4 3.394 0.864 0.746 
Free choice of electricity products for consumers consumchoice 1 4 3.273 0.911 0.830 
Energy mix should be determined by free market meconomix 1 4 3.030 1.015 1.030 
Explicit right for own use of electricity for 
individuals 
govparlmix 1 4 2.152 0.939 0.883 
Nuclear phase-out is implementable in 30 years  phaseoutimpl 1 4 3.242 1.062 1.127 
Urgency of energy transition is high reconstr 1 4 3.152 1.034 1.070 
Safety of current nuclear power plants is given ppcond 1 4 2.727 1.153 1.330 
Energy transition should be implemented 
subsidiarily  
implcomp 1 4 2.303 0.883 0.780 
Table 3: List of survey items included in cluster analysis. Support for different beliefs regarding the new energy act were measured 
with a four-point scale from 1 = ‘fully disagree’ to 4 = ‘fully agree’.  
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Variable Values 
Party Preference  
 Greens 6.6% 
 SP 15.3% 
 GLP 5.3% 
 CVP 9.2% 
 FDP 14.0% 
 SVP 18.9% 
 other 30.8% 
Environmental attitudes, scale 0-5 in the form of a semantic differential  
 Economic welfare <-> Environmental protection 66.7% prefer protection 
 Use of natural resources <-> Protection of nature and landscape 65.6% prefer protection 
Climate change skepticism, scale 0-3 from “disagree” to “agree”  
 I’m unsure if climate change really happens 27.2% skeptics 
 Climate change is primarily caused by humans (rec) 11.7% skeptics 
 The consequences of climate change are exaggerated 37.2% skeptics 
 Climate change is an excuse to patronize or tax people 23.5% skeptics 
Opposition, multiple choice, tick if supported  
 Tax reductions for operators of renewable energy plants 37.6%  
 Subsidies for building renewable energy plants 45.6% 
 Bans on building electricity plants for non-renewable energy sources 27.2% 
 Public tendering to find investors for building renewable energy plants 34.9% 
 Public investments in the production of renewable energy 37.2% 
 Energy companies shall be instructed to build renewable energy plants 25.5% 
 
More information, consultation and education for people considering building 
renewable energy plants 
38.5% 
 None of the above, renewable energies should not be promoted 2.6% 
Age continuous 
Gender 49.1% women 
Education  
 Low 47.6% 
 Middle 22.3% 
 High  30.1% 
Income  
 Low 24.5% 
 Middle 41.4% 
 High  34.1% 
Table 4: List of survey items included in the structural equation model. Original questions in German, French and Italian. Values 
and proportions reported for the full considered sample of n = 1’985 respondents.  
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Factor loadings 
LHS Op RHS Estimate Std. Err P > |z| 
Opposition =~ Ban on non-renewables 1.000 .000 .000 
Opposition =~ Tax reductions .940 .151 .000 
Opposition =~ Subsidies 1.187 .162 .000 
Opposition =~ Public tendering 1.069 .152 .000 
Opposition =~ Public investments 1.038 .142 .000 
Opposition =~ Instruction energy companies 1.063 .139 .000 
Opposition =~ Information, consultation, education 1.323 .167 .000 
Climate Change Skepticism =~ Unsure if climate change happens 1.000 .000 .000 
Climate Change Skepticism =~ Primarily caused by humans (rec) .615 .046 .000 
Climate Change Skepticism =~ Consequences exaggerated 1.118 .056 .000 
Climate Change Skepticism =~ Excuse to patronize/tax 1.055 .053 .000 
Environmental attitudes =~ Environmental protection 1.000 .000 .000 
Environmental attitudes =~ Protection of nature and landscape .843 .049 .000 
Table 5: Structural equation model, regressions. Note: estimated in R with lavaan (Rosseel, 2012). Full results in the supplementary 
material.  
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